

ORGANISED CHAOS AS DIPLOMATIC RUSE AND DEMOGRAPHIC WEAPON

The expulsion of the Ottoman Greeks (*Rum*) from Foça, 1914

Abstract

The process of transition from Ottoman Empire to nation states witnessed dramatic changes in the demographic and socio-economic structures of the once imperial lands. The summer of organized chaos in Foça, an Ottoman boomtown in Western Anatolia, represents one of the chapters of this dramatic transition. After the Balkan Wars, Foça became one of the contested zones of Greek and Ottoman Muslim nationalisms. In 1914, Young Turk clandestine operations ousted the Greek majority of Foça right before the outbreak of the World War I.

This article argues that this particular demographic project can only be understood within a wider context. The nationalist rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece, unresolved issues of the Balkan Wars and Young Turks' radicalization, together with their monopolization of power played crucial roles in the way nationalist competition and inter-ethnic tensions were "imported" into the region. The case of Foça provides a good example showing how such policies of demographic engineering developed in relation to dynamic changes of the period rather than being master planned in retrospect. The case of Foça also shows us that those who were subjected to nationalist violence are more likely to participate in nationalist projects. This paper discusses this over the comparison of natives' roles and perceptions of the forced migration as opposed to those of the Muslim refugees from the Balkans.

Introduction

When salt from Ottoman Eski Foça¹ won a medal² for being a significant export at the famous Chicago World's Fair in 1893, Eski Foça was already a burgeoning town that was expanding as the result of its growing population

1. It is also referred to as Phokaia and/or Phocaea in English/Latin, Παλαιά Φόκαια in Modern Greek, Παλαιός Φόκαια in Classical Greek and Foça-i Atik or Karaca Foça in Ottoman documents. Today in Turkey it is known as Eski Foça.

2. BOA (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*), YA. Hus, 288/55, 10/B /1311.

and economic vigour. Located to the northwest of İzmir/Smyrna, a prominent cosmopolitan trade hub in the Mediterranean, Eski Foça was the central town of the county of Foçateyn. Eski Foça, which had been a boomtown since the mid-nineteenth century, was one of the many trade hubs in the eastern Mediterranean that grew as the result of the incorporation of the region into the world economy. The county, together with settlements such as Yeni Foça (Νέες Φώκιες), Gerenköy (Γκερένκιοϊ), Kozbeyli (Κούζμπεγλι) and Ulupınar, was producing important goods for both internal and external markets. These products were shipped from the port of Eski Foça, and a variety of imports were brought into the empire through the port as well. Located on the western Anatolian coast, Foçateyn was part of the central regions of what is traditionally referred to as the “core empire.” However, in the early twentieth century this positive situation was destined for dramatic changes and, ultimately, the boomtown of Eski Foça would become a ghost town. In the spring of 1914 (just before World War One), organised chaos was used against the local *Rum* (Ottoman Greeks) in Foça, marking the beginning of this transition. It should be noted, however, that this turning point is just one chapter in the larger transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. In Foçateyn, this transition from empire to nation state entailed a shift from being located at the “core of the empire” to becoming a borderland, and dwindling from a county of 23,000 people with a strong export economy in 1914 to a provincial county, the economy of which had shrunk. By the 1920s and 1930s, after the Turkish Republic had been established, the county had a population of just a few thousand.

Although the economy of Foçateyn was dominated by mining (salt, marble, stones for construction and millstones) and agricultural production (including important export goods such as raisins, grapes, olives and olive oil), its economic character was reshaped by an increasing volume of trade in the mid-nineteenth century. This was a result of the increasing European economic presence in Ottoman markets and of the globalisation of world markets, which occurred as the result of the industrialisation of shipping.³ In the spring of 1914, just before the unleashing of what I term “organised chaos”, which led to the forced migration and killing of Ottoman Greeks, the county’s

3. The industrialisation of shipping is a concept coined by maritime historians that refers to the drastic changes that took place in the nineteenth century. These changes were related to the volume of goods that were carried and the types of vessels traversing the world. Basically, it refers to a transition from wood to steel and from sails to steam in the shipping industry. Downes argues that these changes in the shipping triggered further changes in the construction of modern waterfronts that constituted a part of the Ottoman modernisation process. Brant William Downes, *Constructing the Modern Ottoman Waterfront: Salonica and Beirut in the late Nineteenth Century*. (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Stanford University 2008), 3-5.

population had swelled to nearly 23,000,⁴ the majority of whom were Ottoman Greeks. This included many Greeks (Ottoman or otherwise) who had migrated from the islands in the Aegean and beyond in search of better job opportunities.⁵ Muslims, whether Kurdish, Turkish or otherwise, had also long been residents in the county along with non-Muslims such as Greeks, Armenians and Jews. The native population, together with the almost omnipresent migrants (whose numbers increased in the nineteenth century) were part of a cosmopolitan setting that reached its peak in the pre-World War One era. On any given day, one would have heard many languages in the harbour town of Eski Foça. However, by the early Republican period, Eski Foça was practically a deserted ghost town that had been demographically engineered into a “homogenous” national community. Less than one third of the original population remained. Devastated by constant warfare, migrations, banditry and state violence, Foçateyn lost its human resources, infrastructure and economic “know how.”

The story of this radical transition in Eski Foça runs parallel to the story of a multidimensional period of change in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. Wars, European imperialism, capitalism, competing nationalisms of the elites as saviour projects, intercommunal and interethnic tensions and modernisation reforms all played their part in this period of turmoil that resulted in the construction of nations such as Armenia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey. This occurred through the respective nationalists’ mutual exclusion of entire communities from their lands, properties, identities or even lives. Many nation states in contemporary Eastern Europe and the Middle East emerged from this period of wars of rival nationalisms and the violence of intercommunal groups, interethnic groups and states. Charles Tilly’s well-known quotation brilliantly summarises the process of the creation of post-Ottoman nation states: “war made the state and the state made war.”⁶ The events that took place in Eski Foça in 1914 represent a chapter in the story of the transition from the Balkan Wars to the Turkish Republic, which is itself a smaller chapter within the greater transition from the Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic.

4. This number is based on the total number of residents of the county of Foçateyn in 1914. Since seasonal migration was a widespread phenomenon in the Western Anatolian region, it is not possible to give exact numbers for the settlements in the county. In spring, most of the residents in the county migrated to Eski Foça, which was the largest settlement in the county.

5. Most of the interviewees in the CAMI (Center of Asia Minor Institute, Athens) oral history documents (on ΠΑΛΙΕΣ ΦΟΚΙΕΣ and ΝΕΕΣ ΦΟΚΙΕΣ) state that either one or both of their parents are from the Kingdom of Greece. They also state that their parents are often islanders who previously resided on one of the Aegean islands.

6. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making”, in: Charles Tilly, (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. (Princeton 1975) 42.

This article aims to contribute to this story of transitions with a discussion of a critical time in the history of the county of Foçateyn, one of the many battlefields of competing nationalisms, by exploring one of the earliest examples of the use of demographic engineering as a weapon of warfare by the Ottoman political elite. It argues that this particular episode of demographic engineering was a result of realist war diplomacy, nationalism and the Muslim refugee phenomenon. This paper also aims to bring a new dimension to the larger discussion of the demographic violence in the late Ottoman Empire by discussing one of the earliest examples of such violence.

The events of 1914 and the spreading of the Balkan tragedies

When the Community of Union and Progress (CUP) [*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*] installed its dictatorship on 23 January 1913 with a successful coup d'état, the Balkan states had already reached the Midye-Enez line, a front stretching from the port town of Midye on the Aegean to the port town Enez on the Black Sea and passing just outside the imperial capital Istanbul. The threat of further territorial losses was imminent for the Ottomans. After the coup d'état, Enver Paşa, a prominent CUP leader, seized the opportunity presented by the Balkan states' rivalry and recaptured Edirne when the Bulgarian army was busy fighting on the other battlefronts of the Balkan Wars. Subsequently, cleansing the border areas of its resident Christian populations, specifically the Bulgarians and Greeks, became a priority for the CUP. At the beginning of the twentieth century and particularly after the Balkan Wars, forced migration and demographic engineering had become a norm used to legitimise and secure the existence of national communities. The political problems of the Ottoman Balkans before the Balkan Wars and the methods used to deal with them also spread to other parts of the empire after the war. This is how Foçateyn became yet another contested zone of rival nationalisms – of the Greeks and Ottoman Muslims – and, in the process, many Greeks were forced to migrate for the legitimisation of Ottoman Muslim nationalism.

In 1914, the ousting of “internal enemies” from the county of Foçateyn represents a later stage of what had already been started by the CUP in 1913 in the region of Thrace and areas around the Marmara Sea.⁷ In addition, these

7. It should be noted that the CUP did not initiate or make use of all the intercommunal and interethnic tensions of the post Balkan Wars period in Thrace or Marmara regions. There were numerous cases in which wartime hostilities created spontaneous intercommunal and interethnic violence among the Christians and the Muslims of the Empire who lived in the regions affected by warfare. For a discussion of the issue see: Ahmet Efiloğlu, *Osmanlı Rumları: Göç ve Tehçir (1912-1918)*, (İstanbul 2011), 67-69. However, there are also many cases where the CUP played an important role in the forced migrations, ousting

events in Foçateyn are but one chapter in the wider demographic engineering process that led to the creation of a Turkish nation state. Although this “process” might appear in retrospect to have been steady and well-planned, in Foçateyn this was not the case. Demographic engineering projects were formulated in relation to the ever-changing realities of times of crises, from the Balkan Wars in 1912 to the Lausanne Peace treaty in 1923. I shall initially attempt to reconstruct the events of 1914 through eyewitness accounts and archival material. Subsequently, I shall discuss the context in which these events should be evaluated and how certain groups, local and otherwise, were mobilised for the use of violence.

Setting the stage for violence

Looking over the history of the early twentieth century in the county of Foçateyn, there are hardly any signs of a gradual pattern of conflict that would irrevocably lead to the events that occurred between 1914 and 1922. Prior to the twentieth century, there is simply no evidence of an established pattern of interethnic conflict in any of the historical sources about Foçateyn that were used for this study. There were, however, some particular cases of intercommunal conflict that reflected the insecurities and social changes occurring in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁸ In the end, such instances were resolved by the state with finesse and did not constitute a basis for long lasting social tensions. Therefore, the spring of 1914 was a shocking time for the residents of Foçateyn, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

Life in the county of Foçateyn was deeply affected by the Balkan Wars between 1912 and 1913. Large numbers of Muslims fled to Anatolia during the Balkan Wars, which from the very start were a disaster for the Ottomans. Judging from the unnatural increase in the Muslim population of Foçateyn from 1908 to 1914 (3,617 to 7,427), it is clear that Foçateyn was one of the destinations of Muslim refugees from the Balkans.⁹ This is also evident in the way that the presence of *muhacirs* (Muslim refugees) was perceived in

operations and/or tensions in these regions. See: Fuat Dünder, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi*, (İstanbul 2008), 175-197.

8. In 1823, the county of Foçateyn was reported to be under the constant threat of piracy. On one occasion, pirates took refuge on the island of Orak just across from the harbour of Eski Foça. Their presence caused panic and, subsequently, a small group of Muslims who accused Greek farmers of collaboration with the pirates attacked them. Some farmers were killed and their properties were damaged as well. The government cleverly resolved the unrest by simultaneously capturing the pirates and those who were responsible for attacking the peasants. See BOA, HAT 872/38758-A, (1823) and BOA, HAT 872/38758 (1826).

9. For the numbers see Erkan Serçe, “Aydın Vilayeti Salname ve İstatistiklerinde Foçateyn Kazası”. In *Foça Üzerine Yazılar/Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı Anısına*. (İzmir 1998). Also see Kemal

the county. On 11 June 1912, the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs sent a telegram to the province of Aydın asking about the reliability of a complaint made by the Orthodox Patriarchate. It asked whether or not Cretan *muhacirs*¹⁰ had attacked native Ottoman Greeks in the county of Foçateyn and harmed their animals and property, and it urged an investigation; if the perpetrators were found guilty, they were to be resettled elsewhere.¹¹ On 17 June 1912, a reply was sent back to the Ministry of Internal Affairs stating that there were no Cretan *muhacirs* in the county and no such attack had ever occurred. The response to this communication was to ask the Patriarchate to be specific and open about where and when such events took place.¹² In conclusion, although it is not possible to know if such an attack ever took place, it is certain that the Orthodox Patriarchate felt threatened by the influx of Balkan Muslims into the Greek-dominated regions of the empire. There seems to be very limited refugee influx in the county of Foçateyn in 1912 and the major influx of refugees only took place after the organised chaos of June 1914. The Ottoman government shared the Patriarchate's perception of threats, but in the opposite direction. At the height of the first Balkan War, the leaders of the province of Aydın decided to impose martial law. Telegram correspondence in November 1912, between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Aydın Province and the Port (*Bâb-ı Âli/Meclis-i Mahsusa*), summarises the Ottoman administration's perception of non-Muslim populations. All these telegrams urged that the Ministry of War (*Harbiye Nezareti*) be granted the power to introduce martial law and a military court in response to the Ottoman reverses in the war being celebrated by many non-Muslims. This, in turn, fuelled hatred between the Ottoman *millets*, which affected security in the province. In addition, and more importantly, telegrams stated that the supporters of the Greek cause were very likely to stash guns, ammunition and explosives in their houses, schools and churches. They pointed out that in the Balkans this had been the case and it had affected the outcome of the war.¹³ Thus, the Patriarchate believed that the Ottomans were "importing" conflict by settling refugees who had suffered at the hands of Christian states to areas dominated by Ottoman Greeks, while the Ottoman administration thought that the conflict existed

Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914 Demographic and Social Characteristics*, (London 1985), 174.

10. Although Crete was not one of the battlefronts in the Balkan Wars and had not been a part of the Ottoman Empire since 1898, its self-declared unification with Greece in 1908 was recognised by the Kingdom of Greece in October 1912 and internationally after the Balkan Wars. This is why Cretan Muslims were subjected to forced displacement in this period.

11. BOA, DH. H., 13/59, 25/C/1330, pg:1.

12. BOA DH. H., 13/59, 25/C/1330, pg:2.

13. BOA, İ.MMS., 156/1330-Z-2, (2/Z/1330), pp. 2,4,5.

because of Greek propaganda. Certainly, the war was creating extremely fertile grounds for nationalist agitation.

The issue of the settlement of the Muslim refugees was a central problem in the wider Ottoman Empire before, throughout and after the Balkan Wars. However, immediately after the first Balkan War in 1912, the influx of Muslim refugees started to affect life dramatically in a number of provinces of the empire, one of which was the province of Aydın. The influx of forcibly displaced Muslims did not end with the Balkan Wars in 1913; on the contrary, it continued and acquired greater political importance with the imminent possibility of a new Greco-Ottoman war, a possibility that was widely feared in late 1913 and early 1914. In this period, places like Foçateyn witnessed a mass influx of Muslim refugees and the almost simultaneous ousting of native Christian populations. News of atrocities and misconduct both against the Muslim refugees of the Balkans and the native Christians of Anatolia flooded the capital almost simultaneously. Emmanuelidi Efendi, an Ottoman Greek member of the Ottoman Parliament for Aydın province, raised the issue of the influx of Muslim refugees into Greek-dominated areas in parliamentary debates. Emmanuelidi, together with 13 other parliamentarians, tabled a motion for the investigation of the forced migration of Ottoman Greeks. He asked why Muslim refugees were not directed to less populous areas of the empire, but rather were sent to areas inhabited largely by Ottoman Greeks. In his question, he was referring to the entire period stretching from 1912 to the aftermath of the Balkan Wars in 1914. Talât Paşa, who was then Minister of Internal Affairs, answered his question by underlining the atrocities carried out by Balkan nations against Muslims and he argued that once *muhacirs* flooded these (western Anatolian) parts of the country, it would be impossible to stop conflicts and rivalry resulting from resentment.¹⁴

Talât Paşa said that there was no other option but to place those *muhacirs* in populated areas since to do otherwise would put a substantial burden on the state budget (which had already shrunk and was strained by war expenditures) and be fatal for the refugees because to send them to empty places like the Syrian desert would mean certain death.¹⁵ The way the Balkan Wars ended and the tensions of the subsequent diplomatic environment played significant roles in the way this question of *muhacir* migrations was dealt with. In line with the spirit of the era, these Muslim migrants became an asset and a means to legitimise “national borders” through battles of population statistics wielded by rival nationalist movements. For this reason, it is useful to perceive the events of 1914 as the next chapter of the Balkan Wars’ unresolved disputes. When Talât responded to the point raised by Emmanue-

14. Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan politikası (1913-1918)*, (İstanbul 2008), 220.

15. Ibid. 257.

lidi, the ousting of the Ottoman Greeks in the county of Foçateyn had already occurred. At this point, it is useful to provide an overview of the winter of 1914 and examine how the events unfolded in order to clarify the nature of this state of affairs.

“Organised chaos” in Eski Foça, June 1914

According to Nicos Vrutanis (Νίκος Βρουτάνης) and Georgeos Savvas (Γιώργος Σάββας), residents of Çakmaklı¹⁶ (Τσακμακλί) at the time, the ousting of the Greeks in the county of Foçateyn started as early as the winter of 1914. In their interview,¹⁷ they state that the mayor of their village, Kourela (Κουρέλα), had received an envelope¹⁸ and was told that he should only open the envelope when he was told to, or he would be killed. According to them, the mayor was a rather stubborn person and opened the letter anyway. He told the villagers that the orders “burn and plunder” were written therein. Vrutanis and Savvas remember that the mayor tried to spread the word but nobody took him seriously.¹⁹ They state that after a while (probably sometime between late winter and spring), Turks started beating Greek shepherds and capturing their sheep

16. Çakmaklı was a Greek village 4 kilometres (map distance) northwest of another predominantly Greek village named Kozbeyli. Modern day Çakmaklı is in the county of Aliağa, which is next to the county of Foçateyn.

17. CAMI, Oral history collection on ΠΑΛΙΕΣ ΦΟΚΙΕΣ and ΝΕΕΣ ΦΟΚΙΕΣ. Βρουτάνης and Σάββας interview, 22/4/1964, Athens.

18. The arrival of this envelope is worthy of discussion. The ousting of Ottoman Greeks in 1914 was a project based around intimidating the native populations into avoiding diplomatic pressure. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the letter sent to Çakmaklı was intentionally “misdirected” to Greeks instead of Muslims. However, it has also been argued that there was a possibility that the Kingdom of Greece would intervene in such matters. Mehmet Yılmaz argues that the Kingdom of Greece sent some soldiers to Western Anatolia in the spring of 1914 and that they were wearing *chete* (bandit) clothes, and that they tried to frighten Ottoman Greeks. He claims that the Kingdom of Greece did this in order to Hellenise Macedonia by encouraging these populations to migrate to Macedonia. (See Mehmet Yılmaz, “Balkan Savaşlarından Sonra Türkiye’den Yunanistan’a Rum Göçleri”, *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no: 10, (2001): 19, 20. Although this would not have been farfetched given the nationalist spirit of the era, his sources are not convincing. In order to support his claims he refers to an archive document (BOA, DH-ŞFR, 41/85, (01-B-1332)) that does not mention anything about a possible intervention of the Kingdom of Greece.

19. This is interesting since by the time Çakmaklı Greeks heard about a possible assault and ousting operation, both Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece were already aware of similar operations. Therefore, one might have expected them to take such treats more seriously. This might mean that either small rural communities such as Çakmaklı were disconnected from the rest of the empire and therefore failed to hear about similar stories or that they never assumed the effects of Balkan Wars would reach their region.

herds. Later, it was stated that Turkish women had started to steal their possessions and they were searching for money. Although they do not make clear statements about who those attackers might be, it is logical to assume that it was either *chetes* (bandits)²⁰ or *muhacir* groups (judging from the accounts of women looking for money and sheep being seized) or both. After all, intercommunal tensions between native groups and *muhacirs* was a feature of the Balkan War era,²¹ but native Muslims rarely had conflicts with their Greek neighbours in the region. Vrutanis and Savvas state that after those events, they all understood that a wave of persecution would soon ensue. Although some of them left for the island of Partheni (Παρθένι), many escaped to Eski Foça. Meanwhile, elsewhere in and around the county of Foçateyn (such as in Seyrek),²² similar events were taking place. Especially in the predominantly Greek and inland establishments such as Kozbeyli, Gereköy and Söğütçük (Σουβουτζίκια), Greeks left in large groups for coastal areas or bigger towns in the face of similar threats. There was talk of a Turkish “horde” surrounding the settlements of the county. As a result, the Greeks ended up in the centre of the county, Eski Foça.²³

On 11 June 1914, at around 18:30, a member of the philhellene archaeologist Félix Sartiaux’s excavation team, Charles Manciet, witnessed the influx of the ousted and fleeing Ottoman Greeks. That evening, he had been working on an excavation near the road from Eski Foça to Menemen. He was surprised when he saw a long convoy of people with their belongings in hand. He learned that they were Ottoman Greeks fleeing Gerenköy²⁴ and that they were seeking refuge in Eski Foça.²⁵ This is particularly significant since on the day Manciet witnessed the Ottoman Greek refugees, the ousting was on the verge

20. *Chetes*, or *chettes* or *Çete*, is a widespread term used for bandits. These groups often consisted of outlaws, draft dodgers and refugees. They had only male members, with a few rare exceptions. Although they often escaped state authority by roaming the mountains, it is also the case that they were used as irregular forces in the service of the state to which they had allegiance at the time.

21. This was primarily because of the Balkan Wars, which uprooted thousands of Muslims and Christians. The war affected both migrant Muslims and native Muslims. However, the traumas of the former were much greater. News of intercommunal and interethnic tensions dominated the post-Balkan War era, especially in the border provinces of the empire.

22. For the events in Seyrek, see the foreign reporters mentioned in Dündar’s article: Fuat Dündar, “1914’te Rumlar’ın sürülmesi, Yabancı inceleme heyeti gözlemleri ve Seyrek köyünün foto hikayesi”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, 189 (2010), 82-86.

23. Haris Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée 1913-1920 Le Témoignage de Félix Sartiaux*, (Paris 2008), 184. Originally taken from Félix Sartiaux, *Le sac de Phocée et l’expulsion des Grecs ottomans d’Asie Mineure*, (Paris 1914).

24. Also referred to as Σερεκιοί or Γκερένγκιοί, which was a predominantly Greek village among the hills of the county of Foçateyn.

25. The original of this account, which was written by Charles Manciet on 18 June 1914, can be found in Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 185-191.

of starting in Eski Foça. Combined with the accounts of Vrutanis and Savvas, it is also clear that Eski Foça had become a refuge not only for Gerenköy Ottoman Greeks, but for all Ottoman Greeks of the county and its surroundings. This choice was understandable since Eski Foça was the centre of the county and, therefore, would have offered greater security and means of shelter. In addition, its busy harbour also offered the best means of escape to the nearby Aegean islands. This factor explains why there was such a relative density of violence in Eski Foça compared to the rest of the western Anatolian coast. Since Eski Foça was the last place to be cleansed of Ottoman Greeks in the county of Foçateyn, many others (like Nicos Vrutanis and Georgios Savvas) took refuge in this town (and on a smaller scale also in Yeni Foça) until they were surrounded in the end and it became much harder for them to escape. This was simply because there were not enough vessels to carry them to the closest safe havens, the Aegean islands (Midilli/Λέσβος or Sakız/Χίος). Even to reach islets like Partheni or Orak people needed at least a small vessel, and that would prove to be a problem when the situation worsened. However, the relative density of refugees or the lack of vessels are not in themselves enough to explain why the violence in Eski Foça escalated.

According to Manciet, the next morning (12 June 1914) witnessed widespread panic among people since they thought that the *chetes*, who they had been running away from, were about to come to Eski Foça too. The account of Vrutanis and Savvas²⁶ states that they initially took refuge in a Greek school in Eski Foça having escaped from Çakmaklı. They also state that they were later alerted that at night the Turks would come and slaughter them. Several families gathered in a sturdy house for protection. Their account again corroborates that of Manciet. According to the French archeologist, people initially locked themselves in their houses but later, around noon, approximately 1,000 people fled with fishing vessels and sailing boats to Lesbos/Midilli. He and Félix Sartiaux state that they were surprised to see people fleeing without their belongings before “the enemy” showed up. Subsequently, Sartiaux, Carlier, Dandria and Manciet all went to the governor (*Kaymakam* of the county of Foçateyn, Ferid Ali Bey) and insisted that their lives and their property be protected. Four gendarmes were assigned to them and they used their houses, with a French flag at the entrance, as sanctuaries for other Christians too. They were able to safeguard around 800-900 people. The same night, at around 20:00, Manciet heard gunshots from “the army” (he must have assumed the group to be a part of the regular army, which was not the case) that was marching silently over the mountains surrounding Eski Foça. He recalls hearing shots from two different directions and assumes that there were two armies from opposite directions encircling Foça.

26. CAMI, Βρουτάνης and Σάββας interview, 22/4/1964, Athens.



Picture 1: *Chetes proudly showing off their loot, and fleeing Ottoman Greeks on the pier (right) and in front of Sartiaux's house (left).*

Source: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 199.

According to Sartiaux, the gunshots and the gradual approach of the bandit and *chete* hordes must have been pre-organised.²⁷ Judging by the way the *chetes* moved, he assumed that their goal must have been to create panic

27. Sartiaux refers to a pamphlet that he got from a prominent Turkish friend of his as proof of the organised nature of the events. He says that the pamphlet was sent to certain places before the ousting took place, and claims that it began with the phrase “*Çete reisleri ve Karakol Zabıtları'ne*” (“To Chete leaders and Gendarmes”). The only copy of this pamphlet is included in Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 182. However, it is not possible to read it due to the



among the Greeks so that they would flee of their “own accord.” However, the Ottoman Greeks had neither the willingness, nor the means to escape, and more violence was imminent. Naturally, they did not want to leave their lands, belongings and beloved towns. In addition, they must have been shocked by the events that were occurring around them. Manciet states that the two armies started to plunder the city at night and that by morning (13 June 1914)

low quality of the reproduction. Nevertheless, the document does not seem to say anything about *chetes*.

the gunshots were getting closer to their homes. When they left their houses, he recalls seeing “the most disgraceful acts ever imaginable.”²⁸

Manciet states that on the morning of 13 June, *chetes* on foot and on horseback, armed with rifles (γκράδες in Vrutanis and Savvas’ account, *fusil gras* in Manciet’s account), had occupied Eski Foça. Christians rushed to the shoreline but there were no ships left for them to board, and many people either tried to defend themselves in their homes or rushed onto the small piers in the hope that a ship would approach. This made matters worse since plunder-seeking *chetes* had to force those who stayed in their houses to leave. These bandits, who were not bound by any military code of conduct or responsibility, did whatever they wanted and the local gendarmerie did not intervene. In addition, people who were on the small piers panicked and as a result some people drowned. Manciet’s account describes one violent scene in which a Christian house was assaulted and plundered by *chetes* and when the owner tried to defend his house and his family, he and later his wife were killed. According to Manciet, it was fortunate for the Christians that two large steamships happened to be right outside the harbour. The Frenchmen convinced the captains of these ships to allow the Christians on board and, in this way, many had the opportunity to leave.

Around noon, Manciet and his fellows, horrified by the plundering and killings, pressured the gendarmeries, who until then had been bystanders, to take action and to assist in the deportation of Christians. Their intimidation succeeded and the gendarmes allowed safe passage for those who were still trying to reach the shore and the steamships. Manciet also recalls that when things were about to calm down, he saw packed camels ascending the mountains by roads connecting Eski Foça to the hinterland. They were loaded with the plunder taken from the town. This also suggests that there were no initiatives whatsoever to stop further abuses even after the gendarmeries were persuaded to help.

Félix Sartiaux, the head of the archeological excavation team that Manciet worked for, also wrote his account of the events.²⁹ Although there are many similarities with Manciet’s account, Sartiaux presents more details about how the *chetes* had gathered and the resistance of the Greeks. According to Sartiaux, a group of armed *chetes* consisting of approximately 150 men started to attack the town of Sulucak where the local Greeks tried to defend themselves and sent their wives and children to an island. Subsequently, the *chetes* attacked the villages of Sukuyu, Yeniköy and Hoca (Koca) Mehmed. According to Sartiaux, more Muslims joined the *chetes* with each attack. Indeed, he reports

28. Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 185-191.

29. There are two sources of his account: his own book [Félix Sartiaux, *Le sac de Phocée et l’expulsion des Grecs ottomans d’Asie Mineure*, (Paris 1914)] and his report to the British authorities who were also in the region at the time. FO (Foreign Office)195/2458, 542-543.

that salt mine workers (*hammal*) from Benghazi, some hooligan Muslims and gendarmeries wearing peasant clothes were among those who joined the mob. Sartiaux notes that their final destination was Eski Foça, where they plundered the town and killed as many as 50 Christians, some of whose names Sartiaux recorded. He also claims that the doctor of the governorship, Saim Bey from Ulupınar and Cafer Ağa and his son, were leading participants in the pillage.³⁰ Sartiaux's report to the British and his subsequent book that was published in 1914 present a picture that underlines the organised nature of the events. In his book, Sartiaux presents a photograph of a pamphlet on a wall that purportedly addressed *chete* leaders and *karakol* (gendarmerie, security forces) officers. He states that this document was sent to him by a wealthy Turkish friend (Karabina Zade Ali) and that it proves the cooperation of regular and irregular troops in the ousting of Ottoman Greeks.³¹

The story presented by Manciet's and Sartiaux's accounts becomes more complete with the stories of the Turkish and Ottoman Greek eyewitnesses. According to the account of Vrutanis and Savvas, many of the Ottoman Greek families who took refuge in a sturdily built house ran away from the windows towards the back of the house when the *chetes* tried to break down the door (on 13 June). They escaped to the mountains and stayed there for seven days. Afterwards, they recall the arrival of a ship named Pinios (Πηνειός) that had come to pick them up. They say that those who had boats travelled quickly to alert the residents of Lesbos/Midilli that the terrified residents needed to be picked up. Georgeos Savvas also recalls that those who had escaped to the islet Partheni (Παρθένι) had no water supplies and had to drink seawater. He also says that two Ottoman Greeks who, assuming the violence was over, had returned to their houses, but were subsequently killed by *chetes*. In the end, the surviving Ottoman Greeks set off for Lesbos/Midilli.

Although Manciet's and Sartiaux's accounts provide valuable insights, they fail to describe the situation of the local Muslim residents of Foçateyn at the time. When assessed critically, oral historical accounts of the Muslim residents³² of the county of Foçateyn reveal a complicated picture. Mehmet

30. FO 195/2458, 542-543.

31. Unfortunately it is impossible to read the entirety of the Ottoman script that is written on the pamphlet since the photograph is unclear. However, based on the readable parts, the document seems to bear no relation to the original claim. See: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 183. Later, Sartiaux also claims that the events were carefully prepared in early July during the visit of the governor of Izmir (Rahmi Bey) and various other meetings of local Muslim leaders. See: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 188.

32. There is no written material by the Muslim population of the county of Foçateyn about the events of 1914. This is probably due to the fact that most of the residents of the county of Foçateyn were illiterate. However, this paper will use oral historical documents that were archived by Prof Engin Beber who conducted several interviews about the history of the county in the early Republican period. His interviews are especially detailed and accurate

Peker³³ states that he watched the events of 1914 from his house, located in the centre of Eski Foça. He says, “Out of the blue, from the direction of Menemen, came these *chetes*. Their aim was to steal the Greeks’ belongings without killing them[...].” He then stops speaking and bursts into tears. He remembers *chetes* as foreigners to his region and he curses them as “rats” who “looted, stole and burned down Greek property.” He recalls that Ottoman Greeks took shelter in the Greek school; he states that they (“those thieves”) were the ones who set fire to those very beautiful Greek buildings and even his own high school building. He recalls that since the salt business had come to a halt (probably due to the seasonal nature of salt production), there were not many large ships left, so most of the Ottoman Greeks left in small fishing boats. Since he was primarily around his house, which was located in the mainly Muslim neighbourhood, he remembers *chetes* mostly shooting into air but not killing anyone. Mehmet Peker also states that once his Greek neighbours left, everybody started looting. People went into Greek houses and especially shops in order to loot coffee, sugar and so on. He states that later, Greek houses were occupied by *muhacirs* from Yanya (Ιωάννινα). Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan,³⁴ who remembers the days of pillage and violence with great shame and depression, states that once the Greeks were almost entirely gone “there was so much looting going on[...] everybody took what was left from the Greeks, including food, carpets, furniture[...].” When taken together, these accounts indicate that despite the fact that natives were either bystanders or in some cases even offered resistance,³⁵ there were also many opportunists especially on the last day of the attacks, when it was thought that the Greeks would never return. The eyewitness account suggests that native Muslims were not members of these *chetes* and, significantly, they perceived them as being foreigners.

Another set of eyewitness accounts suggests a different picture. The Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople published a booklet in the midst of the turbulent political climate of 1919 when the British, French, Italians and Greeks had unofficially occupied Istanbul and when the army of the Kingdom of Greece landed in İzmir. *Persecution of Greeks in Turkey 1914-1918*, a booklet that included detailed information about the atrocities carried out against Greeks, includes a chapter about the events in the county of Foçateyn based

about the period after the Greek occupation (1919). However, his interviewees also present valuable insights about the period of the early 1900s. Interviews include rather limited and emotionally loaded memories about the events of 1914. References to this archive will be cited as EBOHA (Engin Berber Oral Historical Archive).

33. He was born in Bağarası on 1317 (1901) and he was a local resident for his entire life. EBOHA Mehmet Peker interview, conducted in Eski Foça, 1995.

34. He was born in Yeni Foça on 1323 (1905) and he was a local resident for his entire life. EBOHA Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan interview, conducted in Menemen, 1995-1997.

35. EBOHA Mehmet Tahsin Kalkan interview, conducted in Menemen, 1995-1997.

on numerous witness accounts, most of which have already been discussed here. It is claimed, based on the eyewitness accounts of Mr. Laurence (a professor in the American College), Mr. Sartiaux, Mr. Carlier, Mr. and Mrs. de Andria (director of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration), Edward Whittal (a merchant in Smyrna), Mr. I. Belhomme, Mr. Vedova and Mr. Manciet that many prominent local Muslims participated in the pillage and atrocities. According to the booklet, the mayor of the town, Hasan Bey, the director of the salt works, Foçateyn Ali Bey, the administrator of the tobacco monopoly, İbrahim Efendi, and a *müezzîn* (Muslim official who leads the call to prayer) participated in murderous acts and pillage.³⁶ However, the booklet does not mention mass participation by the natives of the county, and refers to the account of Manciet for the rest of the events.

When 13 June was over, those who were too poor or unable to find a vessel, and those who were too old to run away, became the target of the organised chaos. Manciet recalls that most of the wounded were older than 60, and sometimes even 90 years old, and that they were wounded while defending their property. According to Manciet's eyewitness account, the nature of the atrocities took a crucial turn around 17 June. He states that soldiers were sent from İzmir to re-establish order, but that these soldiers ended up plundering the town themselves. Manciet states that the atrocities he had witnessed were of an organised nature that aimed at encircling the Christian peasant populations (*reaya*³⁷) of the region. According to him, the murder and plunder continued until 18 June, the day on which he read in the official newspaper (*Resmî Gazete*) that order had been restored and that Christians were no longer in danger. This is also the time when Vrutanis and Savvas's account refers to people leaving on a second ship that came to rescue them. Therefore, when order was restored, all, or nearly all, of the Ottoman Greeks had left already. This date is also meaningful since it was two days after the Minister of the Interior, Talât Paşa, had come to the county with the ostensible aim of restoring order.³⁸

Simultaneous with the events occurring in the county of Foçateyn, between mid-June and July in 1914,³⁹ Talât Paşa was already on a visit to the western

36. Greek Patriarchate, *Persecution of Greek in Turkey 1914-1918*, (Constantinople 1919), 71.

37. Although this term means "peasant" and although it is also used for Muslim peasants, the writer of the accounts uses this term to refer to the Greek residents of the county.

38. BOA, DH. ŞFR, 430/85, (4/H/1330), pg: 2,3.

39. The timing of Talât Paşa's visit is also crucial for another reason. It is highly likely that Talât decided on his next step based on the diplomatic principle of reciprocity with his Greek counterpart Venizelos. In the post-Balkan War era, the international community closely monitored both the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire for any abuses against their minorities. Therefore, the situation of Balkan Muslims must have been considered reciprocal to the situation of Ottoman Greeks. Furthermore, being away from the capital, Istanbul, also helped him dodge diplomatic pressures.

Anatolian coast (between Bursa and İzmir) supposedly in order to establish order and ease diplomatic pressures in response to the news of atrocities coming from all around the region. And of course the county of Foçateyn was one of the places from which such news had come.⁴⁰ Talât also facilitated the participation of foreign observers during his journey in order to boost Ottoman diplomatic credibility. His aim was to discourage Ottoman Greeks from their so-called “spontaneous” attempts at migration that had already resulted in the fleeing of many Ottoman Greeks in the region of Thrace. It is also important to remember that around the same time, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos was also on a similar visit to the parts of the recently enlarged Kingdom of Greece that contained Muslim populations and were experiencing similar states of disorder. Like Venizelos,⁴¹ Talât was also trying to prove to the Great Powers that it was not his country that initiated a possible “casus belli,”⁴² an issue the importance of which I will discuss later. It is crucial to underline that as Talât travelled from Balıkesir to Manisa, during which time he visited Ayvalık, Balya, Bergama, Burhaniye, Dikili and Foça, atrocities against the Ottoman Greeks were still taking place throughout the region. But he was very careful to give the impression that the Ottoman government was doing its best to establish order.⁴³ Later, when he was asked if there were any murders or loss of life during the process of the mass migrations, he answered that only Foça and two villages of Menemen witnessed such atrocities and he added that the guilty parties were being severely punished.⁴⁴ The only archival evidence of this punishment and of Talât’s perception of the events in Foçateyn is from a

40. According to a booklet published by the Greek Patriarchate, Talât Paşa visited Eski Foça in order to brief his plan of the destruction of Ottoman Greeks on 23 May 1914. According to the same source, Eski Foça was surrounded on 31 May 1914 by hordes of armed Turks. However, the only account about the details of his visit is his own account [footnote 45] that contradicts the claims in the Patriarchate’s booklet. The development of events suggests that both sources are misleading in some aspects. See Greek Patriarchate, *Persecution of Greek in Turkey 1914-1918*, (Constantinople 1919), 71-73.

41. For similar policies used by the Kingdom of Greece in the same period, see Glavinis Ioannis, “The Perception of Muslim Minority in Greece in Greek and Bulgarian policy and strategy (1912-1923),” *Études Balkaniques*, 4 (2005): 157-174.

42. Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914/The Ottoman Empire and the First World War*, (New York 2008), 42-57.

43. He publicly condemned the violence publicly and even suspended the governors of Foça, Ayvalık and Biga. See: Azlolan Memurlar. *Ahenk* newspaper, 17 June 1914, No: 5453, pg: 2. The governor (*Kaymakam*) of the county of Foçateyn, Ferit Ali Bey or (Ferid Bey) was removed from his office together with the governor general of the county of Biga on the 22nd of June 1914, See: BOA., BEO., 4293/321973, (Hicri: 12/B/1332) due to his failure in maintaining security. However, the same Ferit Bey was re-appointed as a *Kaymakam* to the county of Karamürsel, yet another area with sizeable amount of Christian Ottomans in the Marmara region, on 9 January 1915, BOA., İ.DH., 1512/1333/S-31, (Hicri: 22/S/1333).

44. Diran Kelekyan, “Seyahat Etrafında Dahiliye Nazır-ı Muhteremiyle Mülakat,” *Sabah* newspaper, 29 June 1914, No: 8902, pg: 1.

coded telegram that he sent from the governorship of İzmir to the Ministry of Internal Affairs at 16.30 on the 17 June 1914 (4 June 1330 according to the Ottoman calendar).

The account of the events provided by Talât Paşa in his telegram is as follows:

Yesterday morning, we went to (Eski) Foça together with Vali Bey (the governor of İzmir). Events with serious repercussions had occurred there. A group, consisting of 500 people from some villages and settlements around the region, traversed the mountains above Foça. They intended to loot the city and at that moment the Christian residents panicked and quickly tried to seek refuge on a Greek ship that was in the harbour. The *Kaymakam* (governor of Foçateyn) failed to show the courage to send his 20 gendarmeries to stop this group [of looters] because it was large and its members so numerous. These people, together as a group, entered the town and they started looting and there is not a single home, shop or establishment left untouched, all was plundered. Subsequently, all the Greeks migrated to other places. However, a second group was left behind, and among them nine people died. Two of these people died because they were in such a rush to board the ship and it is understood that they drowned in their panic. The governor of the county (*kaymakam*) will be removed from his position because he failed to order his gendarmeries to take action. This request is hereby written to the ministry. As of yesterday and today, it appears that order had been restored in the county. Declarations have been issued to the villages in order to let people know that those who attempt to disturb the internal and external security of the state will be punished with the death penalty. If the situation calms down by Friday, I will be able to travel to Çanakkale by ship.⁴⁵

There are many inconsistencies in Talât Paşa's account. First of all, based on the chronology of the text, he must have been in Foça at the same time as Manciet and the rest of Sartiaux's excavation team. Although Manciet states that they finally convinced the *kaymakam* to send in his gendarmeries, Talât does not seem to know about this. Neither Talât nor Sartiaux and Manciet seem to be aware of each other's presence in the same town. This is surprising given Talât's cautiousness regarding diplomatic pressure. One might have expected Talât to be aware of foreign observers' presence, since he wanted to give the message that the Ottoman government was doing its best to establish security and order. At the beginning of the telegram, Talât claims that the people of the surrounding villages encircled the mountains of Eski

45. BOA, HR.HM Ş.İŞO., 120/54, (11/Ha/1330). It is interesting to note that although it does not say so in the telegraph, the dossier that carries this telegraph is titled as "the attack of the Cretean *muhacirs* on Ottoman Greeks."

Foça, but he does not refer to them as *chetes*.⁴⁶ Firstly, photographic evidence and eyewitness accounts (both Muslim and Ottoman Greek) suggest that this group (even if it did not solely consist of *chetes*) included many armed *chete* members who were later allowed to leave with their loot. In the photographs of Félix Sartiaux's excavation team, it is clear that there are people with rifles, horses and bandit clothes (typical of the period). However, Talât does not mention these *chete* members and the gunshots, rape, killings and injuries that resulted from their encounters with civilians.⁴⁷

Talât Paşa's account gives the impression that there was interethnic or intercommunal tension among neighbouring communities. This, however, was clearly not the case. If local residents from neighbouring villages had gathered to loot Eski Foça, it would be reflected in the Greek and Muslim accounts. However, Ottoman Greeks who by then (16 June) had been on the run from their own settlements around Eski Foça do not talk about their neighbouring Muslim villages as the attackers.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, as in the case of the account of Vrutanis and Savvas, there is talk about some Turks attacking their shepherds and some Turkish women trying to steal their property long before the attacks and looting started.⁴⁹ In addition, Turkish eyewitnesses also do not remember those "thieves and rats" as locals. They likely would have known them if they were from other Muslim villages since Eski Foça was centrally located in Foçateyn and people travelled around the area. If they had been from surrounding villages, someone surely would have recognised them and, as has been pointed out above, they describe them as being foreigners (not from the region) and *chetes*. If the group mentioned in Talât Paşa's telegram is not from the major towns or villages of Foçateyn, for which there is no evidence, then where did they come from?

The answer to this question is a reflection of why I have employed the term "organised chaos" in this study. In light of the evidence provided so far, it seems justifiable to claim that what happened in 1914 in Foçateyn was an outcome of the combination of the political will (for demographic engineering) of a very limited group (CUP), whose orders were carried out by clandestine

46. He refers to them as "*civar ve bazı kura ahalisi*."

47. However, both Manciet and the booklet published by the Patriarchate of Constantinople (1919) claim that Talât visited Eski Foça and he took an active role in the planning of the events. Even if that was not the case, Talât must have had more intelligence about the events.

48. This is important since we know from oral testimonies that Eski Foça and Yeni Foça were two centres of the county in which (especially in Eski Foça) residents of other villages gathered on certain days of the week for bazaars, shopping and religious ceremonies. Therefore, both Muslims and Christians must have had a certain level of familiarity with their fellow county residents. In none of the oral testimonies are the attackers defined as "other villagers." On the contrary, they are referred to as foreigners or *chetes*.

49. CAMI, Βρουτάνης and Σάββας interview, 22/4/1964, Athens.

tine groups, and the resulting events were shaped by a series of unpredictable peculiarities. This is why I choose to refer to it as “organised” yet also “chaotic.” By the end of the spring of 1914, the population of Foçateyn had dwindled to 8,452⁵⁰ (from 23,180⁵¹ in 1914) with no Christians left. Throughout the late spring of 1914, thousands⁵² of Christians were forced to leave from along the shores of Foçateyn. But the chronology of the events in this period is only the tip of the iceberg. It is impossible to understand the meaning of the events discussed above and my perception of them without reference to the wider context and historical background of the period.

The context and background of the events of 1914

Starting with the loss of Crimea in 1770 and particularly after the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, successive waves of forced displacement and destruction haunted Muslims and non-Muslims in the process of transformation that occurred as the Ottoman Empire was broken apart into multiple nation states. Between 1770 and 1923, approximately 6.9 million people were subjected to atrocities, driven from their ancestral lands and stripped of their properties, and many were killed in the process as well.⁵³ In fact, almost all communities in the former Ottoman lands were so agitated by their experience of atrocities and forced displacement, or the stories told about them over the generations, that nationalist intellectuals were easily able to mobilise people’s resentment for their own ends. For all sides in this nationalist “blood feud,” atrocities committed by the “other” were underlined whereas atrocities against the “other” were silenced, forgotten or legitimised. The organised chaos in the county of Foçateyn represents a “silenced” chapter for Ottoman/Turkish historiography in this greater period of transition.

50. This number is taken from the 1917 population census. Erkan Serçe, “Aydın Vilayeti Salname ve İstatistiklerinde Foçateyn Kazası”. In *Foça Üzerine Yazılar/Cumhuriyetin 75 Yılı Anısına*. (İzmir 1998).

51. Kemal Karpaz, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914 Demographic and Social Characteristics*. (London 1985), 174.

52. According to British sources (FO 195/2458), 18,030 Ottoman Greeks left Foçateyn in 1914. However, this number is larger than the number of total Ottoman Greeks that are presented in the 1914 Ottoman official census (15,670, Karpaz, 1985). Nonetheless, the number presented by the British might still be accurate given the chaotic nature of the events. Greeks who did not reside in the county of Foçateyn fled into the county for sanctuary or for opportunities of escape. Therefore, people from settlements around Foçateyn might have been included in the number presented by the British.

53. For a visual representation of this tremendous century of migration and for the approximate number of people that suffered forced migration, see McCarthy, Justin. *Forced Migration and Mortality in the Ottoman Empire/An Annotated Map*. Turkish Coalition of America, 2010. See: http://www.turkishcoalition.org/files/grants/Forced_Displacement.pdf, 1.

Catalysts of destruction: War and nationalisms

In the Ottoman Empire, a secret society, which later evolved into a political party, played the central role in the unfolding of events that surrounded the collapse of the Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. This organisation was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Although the idea of nationalism existed in the empire before the Young Turks and the CUP, the CUP's gradual evolution into a dominantly nationalist party⁵⁴ with a revolutionary agenda and its hold on power represent crucial turning points. Once established,⁵⁵ the CUP maintained its clandestine paramilitary groups⁵⁶ even when it was not holding the reins of the government. The CUP used these groups to grab parliamentary power, crush political resistance or to realise their nationalist projects. Forged with the military experience of fighting against nationalist guerilla groups and secret societies throughout the years in which the Ottomans lost the Balkans, this group of migrant men was primarily from the Balkans and had become migrants or refugees themselves after 1912. They represented the majority of the CUP,⁵⁷ and they created their own organisation and its paramilitary wing based on the idea that they had suffered greatly in the years of the Macedonian Question and the Balkan defeats. The idea was simple: all means were justified for their political ends. Politics was just a method to seize power and so was guerilla warfare or assassinations.⁵⁸ After all, in their eyes, these were the things that brought success to the Balkan nationalists who defeated them in the Balkan Wars and who had seceded from the Ottoman Empire. These elites, who identified their interests with that of their state, did their best to preserve and develop the power of

54. Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building/From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*, (London and New York 2010), 213-236.

55. *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (Special Organisation) was officially administrated under the *Harbiye Nezareti* (Ministry Of War) on 5 August 1914. However, similar groups existed and operated under that name before that date.

56. There is no clear evidence that unravels the nature and the structure of the groups that were associated with the CUP. However, it is clear that the CUP, most of whose members were experienced in fighting against guerilla warfare, created their own groups to fight for their causes. Powerful CUP leaders like Enver and Talât might have had their own clandestine groups that gradually evolved into what is known as the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*. The existence of such groups and the way they organised are only partially visible in various forms of documents. For a detailed discussion of the topic see: Cemil Koçak, "‘Ey Târihçi, Belgen Kadar Konuş!’: Belgesel Bir Teşkilâtı Mahsusa Öyküsü". In: *Târih ve Toplum (Yeni Yaklaşımlar)*, Sayı: 3, (Spring 2006), 171-214.

57. See Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young...*, (2010), 95-110.

58. For the members of the CUP, politics had been brutalised and the ends justified the means. For a discussion of the development of this political culture among Young Turks see: George Gawrych, "The culture and politics of violence in Turkish society, 1903-1914". In: *Middle Eastern Studies* XXII/3 (1986), 307-330.


the Ottoman polity at a time when a European consensus on the destruction of the “sick man of Europe” was taking shape.

The CUP had not always been what it became after the *Bâb-i Âli* coup. However, once the coup was over and the party had eliminated all opposition, it became a party that acted like a state within state. Understanding the events stretching from 1913 to 1922⁵⁹ requires that we keep this situation in mind. On the one hand, there was the Sultan and the Ottoman parliament. On the other hand, there was a party that was not democratically successful in all elections but still in power. Furthermore, this party (Party of Union and Progress (PUP)) was just the public face of the committee (CUP) that ruled it behind the scenes. Institutions and people throughout the vast Ottoman geography were loyal to one group whereas some were loyal to the other. But this divided nature of the Ottoman elites had practically disappeared by the time the CUP triumvirate installed its dictatorship after 23 January 1913, which enabled it to apply its radical decisions in the empire. One such radical move was the ousting of Ottoman Greeks from the “borderlands” that included the county of Foçateyn. But what was the human resource behind the projects of the CUP? What were the reasons for the unequal acceptance of or resistance to its policies? The history of this period of turmoil in the county of Foçateyn provides answers to those questions. The human resources behind these radical projects were often people who had been victims of other nationalist projects themselves. In the case of Foçateyn, this becomes rather obvious since there was a dramatic difference in the way that the events were perceived by the locals and the *muha-cirs*. This is also where the influence of wars enters the picture.

The members of the CUP, like many of their contemporaries elsewhere in Europe, were preoccupied with positivist ideas of a future society.⁶⁰ CUP members, most of whom were military officers, thought that the “sickness” of the Ottoman Empire could be diagnosed with the tools of science. In their minds, the cure for the Ottoman failures rested in the creation of a Prussian-inspired “Nation in Arms” through the construction of a politically and militarily sustainable Ottoman Muslim motherland that was to be developed by a nationalist economic policy. Intellectuals in the late Ottoman Empire, more

59. The CUP’s physical, human and discursive tools did not diminish when the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War One. On the contrary, through processes of negotiation and competition, they were partially merged with the Turkish nationalist struggle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. However, this period requires specific research that is beyond the scope of this paper. For further reading on the relationship between the CUP and the Kemalist national movement, see Erik Jan Zürcher, *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010).

60. For a discussion of the idea of positivism among Young Turks, see: Şükrü Hanioglu, “Blueprints for a future society: the late Ottoman materialists on science, religion and art.” In: Elisabeth Özdalga (ed.), *Late Ottoman society. The intellectual legacy*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 28-89.



Picture 11: A Populist pamphlet depicting Ottoman Greeks as the “fifth column.”
Taken from: Kutay, *Etniki...*, 206-207. See footnote*

specifically Young Turks and members of the CUP, were not always nationalists. But once they became so, ideas of liberalism, socialism, Islamism, Westernisation, Ottomanism and Turkism were fused to strengthen the position of Ottoman Muslims: “The Unionist politicians, therefore, felt free to use any and all of these ideologies as they saw fit to accomplish their ultimate goal of establishing a strong, modern and unified state.”⁶¹ Wars intensified this process and when elites brought forth their nationalist ideas, they found both supporters and resistance among the Ottoman population.

For the members of the CUP, and especially for the infamous triumvirate,⁶² if an organ in society was irreparably sick, the only method to heal the body was to get rid of the organ. For the CUP, this “irreparable” part of the Ottoman society consisted of the disloyal elements that were often, but not exclusively, non-Muslims.⁶³ When the CUP diagnosed the sickness of their state and decided on the “cure,” there was already popular support for nationalism among various Ottoman subjects. Ottomans, especially some non-Muslim groups such as Armenians, Greeks, Albanians or Bulgarians, were already

* Pamphleting was an essential part of mass politics in the Second Constitutional era. This nationalist propaganda pamphlet is particularly interesting since it reflects the Ottoman nationalists’ perception of the role of Greek nationalists, Greeks and Ottoman Greeks in what they perceived as the “national question of İzmir.” For the Unionists another Balkan/Macedonian tragedy was imminent in western Anatolia after the loss of the Balkan Wars. They feared that their beloved İzmir would share the same destiny with that of Selanik. The main idea behind the cartoon was to demonstrate to the masses how the money spent at the Ottoman Greek enterprises contributed to the suffering of Muslims at the hands of the Greek army and to warn them about the possibility of the same Balkan disaster to happen in İzmir since the cartoons described the unloading of ammunition in front of a famous hotel on the cosmopolitan İzmir coastline (Square 6 says “İzmir Rıhtım Otelı”). The original of the pamphlet is presented in the cited work of Kutay where he wrote his own judgement about it; in addition to that he also wrote the captions that had been used to define the parts of the cartoon. The captions said: “1) Köylümüz hükümete aşâr borcunu öderken (While our villagers pay their debt), 2) Maaş dağıtımı (Salary distribution), 3) Aylık alınca ne yaparız? (What do we do with our salaries?) 4) Verdiğimiz paralar nereye gidiyor? (Where does the money we spend go?) 5) Neler ısmarlıyorlar? (What do they buy with it?) 6) Paralarımız cephane oluyor (Our money is becoming ammunition), 7) Dönüp dolaşp bizi vuruyorlar (It all comes back and they [our enemies/Greeks] hit us), 8) Neticede çırıl-çıplak hicret...(The result is becoming bare naked refugees...)”

61. Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young...*, (2010), 231.

62. The three leading figures of the CUP were İsmail Enver Paşa (Minister of War), Ahmet Cemal Paşa (Minister of the Navy) and Mehmed Talât Paşa (Minister of the Interior, and Grand Vizier).

63. The CUP was also concerned about the loyalties and identities of its Muslim subjects. Its policy was very much in line with the traditional Ottoman logic in which regional homogeneities were to be avoided. This policy is not visible in all of the documents of the CUP. For a detailed study on the topic, see Dündar, Fuat. *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan politikası (1913-1918)*, (İstanbul 2008).

supporting nationalism before their Muslim counterparts. Nevertheless, it is misleading to argue that the CUP installed a nationalist agenda among Ottoman Muslims from the top down.⁶⁴ As was the case with their non-Muslim and European counterparts, Young Turks found their “sleeping beauties⁶⁵” ready to be woken up.⁶⁶ For many people, the nationalist project presented an opportunity for social mobility and it represented “public projects”⁶⁷ for certain groups in society.

Based on how the members of CUP perceived it, the atrocities committed throughout the spring of 1914 against Ottoman Greeks were, in today’s terms, a “preemptive strike.” That is to say, when Eşref Kuşçubaşı, a Circassian *chete* member (*fedaî*), a Unionist and a member of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, presented his report⁶⁸ to fellow Unionists on the situation of non-Muslims on the western Anatolian coast, he underlined the fact that in case of a World War, these “consciously Greekified” regions in Western Anatolia would stab the Ottoman army in the back. He was emphasising that the young Greeks who now resided there were receiving military training on the islands that had been under the control of the Kingdom of Greece since 1913. He also stressed that the Ottoman Greeks were bringing in more Greeks from the Kingdom of Greece through marriage and consciously trying to increase their population. He complained that Muslims had no control over the region around the Aydın province railway network and they were denied jobs on the railway.⁶⁹

64. A very good example of this can be seen in how Muslim middle classes and workers utilised the Unionist agenda of nationalist economic policy (*Milli İktisat*). Çetinkaya skilfully demonstrates how this was possible in the Boycott Movements in the Ottoman Empire. Unionist used these movements but at the same time the popular forces behind them, such as the workers and the Muslim middle classes, also used the nationalist discourse of the Unionists and also contributed to it. See: Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, *Muslim Merchants and Working Class in Action: Nationalism, Social Mobilisation and Boycott Movement in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1914*, (Unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden: 2010)

65. The term “sleeping beauty” here refers to the nationalist perspective of a primordial idea of the nation in which the Hellenes or Turks are out there waiting to be made aware of their “real” selves.

66. There were many cases in which people seized opportunities that were presented by nationalist projects of their respective “national” elites. A good example of one such situation can be seen in the Ottoman boycott movements where Muslim merchants used the opportunity to protest their non-Muslim competitors for the sake of “national” interests that helped further their own. For a detailed discussion, see Y. Doğan Çetinkaya. *Muslim...*, (2010).

67. I think there is a striking similarity between how workers tried to improve their living conditions through public projects like strikes and how nationalist projects also served as such public projects for various groups such as workers and merchants in the Ottoman Empire. For a discussion of the concept of private and public projects, see Marcel van der Linden and Jan Lucassen, *Prolegomena...*, (2009), 13-16.

68. Celâl Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım...*, (1967), Vol: 5, 1574-1576.

69. For the Eşref Kuşçubaşı report, see Celâl Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım/Milli Mücadeleye Giriş*. Vol. 5 (İstanbul 1967) 1579-1589.

For these reasons, Eşref urged that measures had to be taken immediately in order to avoid the loss of these “historically Turkish” lands.

Two rival nationalisms claimed the same territory as “historically theirs” and both tried to use demography to support their claims. Once the perception of a threat was fully established⁷⁰ after Eşret Kuşçubaşı’s report, all Ottoman Greeks were now perceived to be one large homogenous group of “dangerous elements” that had to be eliminated. The county of Foçateyn was one of the scenes of these violent “preemptive strikes” that were designed and carried out by the CUP and its clandestine organisation known as the *Têşkilat-ı Mahsusa*.⁷¹ The ousting of Ottoman Greeks was only the beginning, however, and the CUP carried on with its project of demographic engineering with ever-increasing intensity and violence over its various “disloyal” subjects until the end of World War One and the dissolution of the CUP.⁷² Although we now understand who these *chete* members were and why they showed up in the county of Foçateyn in 1914, we still have to understand the local aspect of the story.

The organised and the chaotic: The alignment of the political and the popular

Based on eyewitness accounts, memoirs, photographs and secondary literature, I think the best way to describe the way that the atrocities of 1914 in Foçateyn took place is to employ the term “organised chaos.” It is clear from the public and secret correspondences of the CUP⁷³ and the memoirs of its prominent figures, like Mahmut Celâl Bayar or Dr. Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray, that demographic engineering was consciously employed as a method of warfare in a planned manner.⁷⁴ The CUP leadership, which had established its

70. As mentioned before, the CUP was not always a nationalist group. The CUP’s perceptions of the non-Muslim communities changed over time. The post 1908-1913 period represents a time interval in which the CUP sought the alliance of various groups in Ottoman society, including Greeks and Armenians. In the end, for various reasons, the CUP failed to gain the trust of non-Muslims. This worked in both ways and after 1913 and with the Balkan Wars, the CUP was sure that non-Muslim’s intentions were against the interests of “Ottoman unity.”

71. A prominent member of CUP, Halil Menteşe, explains the details of the policy against the Greeks in this period. He says that governors and other bureaucrats would not intervene and the ousting of Greeks would be taken care of by the CUP and its “*teşkilat*.” İsmail Arar, *Osmanlı Meclisi Mebusan Reisi Halil Menteşe’nin Anıları*. (Istanbul 1986) 165-166.

72. For a discussion of the similarities of demographic engineering projects from 1914 till the end of the Empire, see Matthias Björnlund, “The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a case of violent Turkification.” In *Journal of Genocide Research*. Vol: 10-1 (2008) 41-57.

73. For a detailed discussion on the nature of the correspondences and examples of them, see Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye’nin...*, (2008), 191-219.

74. For a detailed analysis of the ousting of Greeks, see *Ibid.* 191-246.

dictatorial rule by that time, made this decision and did their best to conceal this planned nature of the events in order to avoid diplomatic repercussions.⁷⁵ They also perceived their actions as diplomatically acceptable on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. For them, the treatment of the Muslims of the Balkans, especially by the Kingdom of Greece, constituted the legitimate basis for actions against Ottoman non-Muslims.⁷⁶ It is also plausible to think that all sides of the nationalist “blood feud” manipulated and/or misinterpreted the other’s acts as sources of legitimacy for their actions.

The CUP used its own hierarchy right down to the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* and this clandestine organisation used various groups (consisting mostly of irregulars, outlaws, ex-convicts or radical nationalists)⁷⁷ to carry out the ousting of the “enemies within.” As is understood from eyewitness accounts, the primary aim of this planned project was to make Ottoman Greeks feel threatened and leave of their “own volition.”⁷⁸ However, this did not take place as planned and there was not enough initiative to stop the resulting violence and, in the end, Ottoman Greeks were forced to leave. A close look at the case of Foçateyn shows why the initial aim failed and why it was no coincidence that there was no initiative to stop further violence. It is crucial to underline

75. According to Dündar, the CUP government was cautious about international attention. Both the boycott movements and the ousting of Greeks were closely watched by foreign observers. Based on secret correspondences and archival documents, Dündar argues that those governors who were “unsuccessful” in ousting the Greeks in an unobtrusive way were removed from their positions (the Menemen and Foçateyn governors) and these were presented as individual cases of misconduct. However, Dündar points out that the secret and organised nature of the events is revealed through this point. He underlines the fact that governors such as those of Bergama or Kınık were not removed from their positions although Greeks were also ousted in their regions. He also states that Talât Paşa was visiting the region when the events were taking place in order to show to the international community that he was against the “misconduct” in the region although he was actually among those who planned it. *Ibid.* 207.

76. A good example, which demonstrates how the atrocities against Muslims in the Balkans are presented, is in a geography textbook that was published in 1913. It urged the new generations to “[...] right this wrong, and prepare to take revenge for the pure and innocent blood that flowed like waterfalls.” See Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman...*, (2008), 15. CUP members frequently talked about these losses and they wanted to keep the memories of misconduct and atrocities alive so that they could defeat the “perpetrators.” For an example of this, see Halil Menteşe’s speech as discussed by Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman...*, (2008), 27.

77. For an example of an archival document that illustrates the use of prominent convicts against the “enemy” in Eastern provinces, see BOA, DH. ŞFR., 44/224, (18/L/1332).

78. The photographs that were taken on the day of the event by members of Sartiaux’s excavation team show the extent of pillage and looting. They also depict some of the Ottoman Greeks who lost their lives that day. One of the pictures is especially explanatory of how events unfolded. It shows a picture of four *chete* members who are passing a group of Ottoman Greeks waiting for a rescue ship by the sea. The *chete* members posed for the camera with their loot in hand and they show no interest in the Greeks nearby. See: Yiakoumis et al., *Phocée*, 200-201.

the fact that the CUP's decision to implement forced migration was not supported by the entire Ottoman state or society. The decision to act was not unanimous even within the CUP cadres.⁷⁹ However, the CUP used the instruments of the Ottoman state to carry out its wishes. The decisions about the ousting operations were largely unknown to the public and they seem to have been unknown to many members of the CUP itself as well. Once the news of the atrocities began to spread, there was both popular support from nationalist groups and resistance from the opposition in the public at large.

In the organised chaos of the spring of 1914, the Muslims of Foçateyn were often bystanders. Yet some of them, natives and *muhacirs* alike, joined the looting on the last day of the events in Eski Foça. Nevertheless, there was a difference in the way that the events were perceived.

A tragic account about a later chapter of violence in 1922 summarizes the situation. When Ferit Oğuz Bayır, a *muhacir*, ex-guerilla, prisoner of war and nationalist teacher himself, was asked about the events of 1922 (the last chapter of the forced migration when some of the Greeks who came back in 1919 during the Greek occupation of Anatolia were drowned and killed by Turkish nationalist forces), he says that the Greeks deserved to die because of the atrocities they committed against the Turk.⁸⁰ Although it was chetes who carried out the attacks in 1914, it is clear that there was a difference between the way native Muslims and Muslims who were refugees from the Balkans perceived it. In short, the accounts of those who were not from the region, like refugees, are different from those who belonged to local networks.⁸¹

Although there were examples of intercommunal tensions and very limited interethnic economic competition among the natives of Foçateyn in the previous century, none of these factors played a significant role in the events

79. For instance, in the case of the ousting of Greeks from the western Anatolian shores, Rahmi Bey, the governor of İzmir and a member of CUP, openly rejected the project more than once during different phases of its implementation. However, it is also argued that later in his life he might have supported the ousting of the Greeks because he benefited personally. For details, see Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin...*, (2008), 201-202.

80. Ferit Oğuz Bayır was born in 1899 in Simav. Coming from a migrant family, he spent his early years in Edirne. He was educated in one of the modern teachers' schools (*Dar-ül Muallimin*) of Abdülhamit 11 and he states that he learned that he was a Turk from his teachers who wrote books about Turkism. Later he became a prominent figure in the Republic of Turkey as a co-founder of the *Köy Enstitüleri*. EBOHA, Ferit Oğuz Bayır interview, Eski Foça, 1995-1997.

81. As Kasaba argues, this pattern is also visible in the way violence was perceived and convicted in the period of the Greco-Turkish war. Those who did not belong to the local networks constituted the majority of the manpower of the nationalist wars that brought destruction to western Anatolia. Many of these soldiers on both sides left destruction in their wake when they retreated or advanced. Reşat Kasaba, *Greek and Turkish Nationalism in Formation: Western Anatolia 1919-1922*, (Italy: European University Institute, 2002), 9.

of 1914. Foçateyn presents a case where nationalist mobilisation had been “imported” as a result of a series of crises in the region at large, rather than as a result of gradual local developments. 1914 represents the first chapter of crisis and violence between the Muslim and non-Muslim natives of the county of Foçateyn that would take place almost without interruption in the prolonged period of warfare from the Balkan Wars to the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

Conclusion

In the nineteenth century, the county of Foçateyn was developing economically and demographically as a result of incorporation with world markets and modernisation reforms implemented by the Ottoman state. Eski Foça, the central town of the county, started to become an important trade hub in the eastern Mediterranean by the mid-nineteenth century. The promising development of the boomtown of Eski Foça was first interrupted by the ethnic cleansing carried out in the spring of 1914. The Greek invasion of Asia Minor in 1919 and the Turkish expulsion of those forces from the county in 1922 resulted in Eski Foça becoming a ghost town by the end of these subsequent chapters of ethnic violence. In all these chapters, the violence that was unleashed by one side of the conflicts was silenced and the other side’s atrocities were underlined.

Judging from the chronology of events and the language that was employed in newspapers and archival documents, it is possible to assume that the Ottoman decision makers, who at that time were members of the CUP, utilised a twofold policy to solve what they perceived to be the problem of the borderlands.⁸² On the one hand, they were constantly trying to homogenise their borders through diplomatic means such as the mutual population exchange of “national minorities.” In doing so, they were trying to clear the borders of the Empire in the post-Balkan War era of the “enemies within,” and it is certain that they were not alone in this respect. After the Balkan Wars, Bulgaria agreed to a population exchange (which took place between September of 1913 and October of 1914).⁸³ The Kingdom of Greece also favoured the exchange of

82. The problem of the borderland meant the problem of “enemies within” and that was only one of the reasons why the centre felt the need to reconsolidate its power in “contested” areas. In his memoirs, Mahmut Şevket Paşa (Minister of War and *Sadrızam (Grand Vizier)*), says that after the Balkan Wars he preferred Bulgaria as a neighbour in the region of Thrace, since the Bulgarians living within Ottoman borders were less numerous than the Greeks and it was easier to exchange populations with Bulgaria. Mahmut Şevket Paşa, *Sadrızam ve Harbiye Nazırı Mahmut Şevket Paşa’nın Günlüğü*, (İstanbul 1988) 171–172.

83. For a detailed discussion of this first population exchange, see Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye’nin...*, (2008)182–191.

minorities. Although negotiations succeeded when Ottoman delegate Galip Kemali Bey presented an official proposal to Greek Prime Minister Venizelos for the exchange of Macedonian Muslims with Greeks from Aydın province on 18 March 1914, the project failed due to the nationalist ambitions of the Kingdom of Greece.⁸⁴

Simultaneously, the Unionists were also trying to oust Christians by various direct and indirect methods. For Ottoman decision makers, another war was imminent (especially a premature war with the Kingdom of Greece⁸⁵) and they felt a need to secure their borders before such a war broke out. To that end, all means were seen as legitimate⁸⁶ and that may be the reason why they did not wait until diplomacy failed. In their minds, this was justifiable for two reasons. First, in the Balkan Wars they saw the problems caused by non-Muslims in the army and behind the lines. Second, they learned that “[...] Great Power diplomacy was a fixed game: the Great Powers were the House, and you could not beat it by playing by the rules.”⁸⁷ The empire’s survival was at stake and they learned from secret Allied correspondence that Ottoman neutrality in a European war was not possible and the Allies were planning to take control of the straits anyway.⁸⁸ In this situation, positivism along with nationalism became a bridge that connected these realist “excuses” for ethnic cleansing.

The CUP instrumentalised the resentment of *muhacirs* in order to instill fear in Christians through the resettlement of *muhacirs*, the use of *chetes* and threats. They used the same guerilla tactics that they had learned in the Balkans and they ethnically cleansed the borders. However, since ousting and diplomacy went hand in hand, and this was to be one of the reasons why the Kingdom of Greece and Ottoman Greeks were suspicious of the imperial authorities’ intentions regarding peaceful solutions, the Ottomans had to be very cautious to avoid jeopardising their attempts at diplomacy. As a result, in public declarations, newspaper columns, the memoirs of decision makers, and documents in the Ottoman archives, a double reality is apparent. For this reason, a more persuasive historical reconstruction is only possible through the simultaneous employment of various sources and perspectives. These

84. Hasan Taner Kerimoğlu, *İttihat Terakki ve Rumlar 1908-1914*, (İstanbul 2009), 432-473.

85. According to Aksakal, the Kingdom of Greece wanted to use Greece’s naval supremacy in the Aegean before the Ottomans obtained their two dreadnaughts. They considered blockading İzmir before late July when the first ship was supposed to arrive. The Greeks hoped to consolidate their hold on the islands and to convince Britain that it should stop delivery of them altogether. Population exchange and ethnic cleansing came into Ottoman strategic thinking in this way in order to compensate for their temporary weakness at sea.

86. This is very well represented in the concept of the “brutalization of politics.” See George Gawrych, “The culture and politics of violence in Turkish society, 1903-1914”. In: *Middle Eastern Studies* XXII/3 (1986), 307-330.

87. Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman...*, (2008), 9.

88. Ibid. 4.

contradictory realities existed because the Ottomans were trying to be cautious; or perhaps it would be more correct to say that they tried to appear to be so, in order to ease diplomatic pressures that had the potential to provoke a premature war or intervention of the Great Powers.⁸⁹ In addition, since they sponsored such unofficial operations in secrecy to maintain the appearance that they were adhering to diplomatic commitments, the control and command of such operations by the centre was also compromised; thus, it was impossible to manage the outcomes.

In the end, realist war diplomacy, and the mobilisation of the resentment of migrant groups (the refugee phenomenon) by a nationalist elite, all of which are results of rather complex historical developments, initiated this catastrophic violence in the county of Foçateyn, which presaged the violence against the Armenians during World War One. In a sense, the unresolved political issues of the Balkan Wars spread interethnic and intercommunal violence from the Balkans to the Aegean. And, in the end, a Pandora's Box was opened in a region contested by rival nationalisms, transformed by modernity and challenged by economic integration, and the results had far-reaching implications for the unfolding of history in these newly formed nation states.

Biography

Emre Erol (1984) gained his M.A. in 2009 at the Sabancı University in İstanbul. He is currently at the last stage of his Ph.D. research on the history of the Ottoman county of Foçateyn at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. He has been teaching a variety of courses at the University of Leiden since 2009, at the Leiden University International Studies in 2013 and at the International Honours College of Leiden University since fall 2013. He is currently employed at the Leiden University Institute of Area Studies (LIAS)/Middle Eastern department. His main areas of interest are the late Ottoman history, migration and nationalisms.

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89. Halil Menteşe openly states in his memoirs that Talât, who coordinated the cleansing of "disloyal elements" with Rahmi Bey and Mahmut Celâl (Bayar) in the province of Aydın, pointed out *muhaçir* groups as the cause of violence against Christians whereas the CUP was the mastermind behind the ousting. According to Menteşe, Talât aimed at easing diplomatic pressures in this way and the government appeared to control the situation although the party (CUP) was behind it. See Halil Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları*, (İstanbul 1986) 165-166.